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William A. Brock has taught in the Departments of Economics at the University
of Rochester, Cornell University, and the University of Chicago, before moving to
the University of Wisconsin, Madison, where he is now Vilas Research Professor
of Economics. He has also been an External Professor at the Santa Fe Institute
since 1989. His many awards include election as a Fellow of the Econometric
Society in 1974, a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in
1992, and as a Member of the National Academy of Sciences in 1998. His over
100 invited lectures include presentations in Poland, Belgium, France, Mexico,
Canada, Japan, Australia, England, Sweden, Norway, and Australia.
Brock has been a leading contributor to the development of methods of intertem-
poral equilibrium analysis in the areas of growth theory, monetary theory, and
finance. More recently, he has played a crucial role in the development of new
methods for the analysis of nonlinear dynamics in macroeconomics and finance,
and models of expectations that relax the assumption of rational expectations.
I interviewed Buz in the faculty cafeteria near the Social Science Research Insti-
tute building, on the Madison campus of the University of Wisconsin, on October
22, 1998. Our interview was interrupted when he had to go to teach, and then
was finished by phone on December 11, 1998. The transcript that follows does
little justice to the liveliness of Buz’s conversation, mainly because of my in-
ability to transcribe the animated facial expressions and hand gestures that made
the mathematical references more concrete. I have added several footnotes to the
transcript, identifying some of the published sources that were mentioned during
our conversation.
Keywords: Nonlinear Dynamics, Optimal Growth, Stability Analysis, Chaos,
Bounded Rationality
Woodford: Let’s start by talking about how you got into economics. That wasn’t
your first field of interest, was it?
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FIGURE 1. William A. Brock.
Brock: That’s right, though I was always interested in economics. I grew up on
a farm where I saw economics working first hand, you see; some people go bust,
some people prosper, and some die. I also saw how little an effect an individual
farmer had on the market, so you had to take all prices and everything under the
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sun given. And so, I just became fascinated with the subject. Why is it that things
just happen to us, some of which are mighty unpleasant? And it always seemed
that when times were good, in the hog business for example, and when you got
set up to raise hogs, the price would bust. So, understanding the dynamics of entry
and exit fascinated me.
As an undergraduate I was actually in mathematics, but I worked for a team
of economists lead by Russell Thompson of the University of Minnesota. He had
come down to the University of Missouri at Columbia, and he hired me as a
sophomore, I believe. I actually did some research with him as an undergraduate.
Woodford: What kind of a project was that?
Brock: We did everything under the sun. I remember one thing we had worked
on was location theory. It was an early type of Loschian location theory. I had
read a lot of that early literature. It’s what we call “the new economic geography”
nowadays.
Woodford: That’s actually become a popular topic again quite recently.
Brock: Of course we were just fooling around with it, but I remember reading
a lot of literature, about things like circular areas, and where you optimally locate
milk plants when you had to compete with neighboring milk plants. Russell was
very interested in that, you know.
Woodford: So you were sure from early on that economics was in fact what
you were interested in working on?
Brock: Actually, yes. But I had asked Russell about going on to graduate school
in economics, and he suggested that what I should do is get a Ph.D. in mathematics
while I was young. That way I would have no mathematical hang-ups. Math
would be second nature, and I could just concentrate on the economic substance
of what I was doing. I would not have any mathematical inferiority complex. To
this day I think it was the best advice that I have ever gotten from anybody. I am
grateful for it. So, I never really had to think about mathematics, it sort of came
naturally.
Woodford: Would you give the same advice to an undergraduate interested in
economics today?
Brock: Well, I don’t know. It was a long row to hoe. And I think things are
more rigid now. At a lot of universities, I don’t think they would hire a guy like
me. I graduated with a math degree from the University of California-Berkeley—
David Gale was my thesis adviser—and to put it quite bluntly, I didn’t know any
economics. It’s one thing to work as a research assistant for an economist, and
quite another thing to go through a formal Ph.D. program in economics. I really
didn’t know any economics, except to have a kind of instinct for it, but that’s not
the same as having formal training, and today I don’t think anybody would hire me.
Nowadays, you know, things are too rigid. I know how many departments make
appointments—looking at credentials, counting publications, rating journals, and
all that kind of stuff.
Woodford: Do you think that we are getting the wrong people by applying these
criteria?
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Brock: I would urge more flexibility. Otherwise you can’t take advantage of an
opportunity. When Lionel McKenzie hired me at Rochester, he got interested in
the thesis work that I was doing with David Gale, and so Lionel just hired me. The
way it looked to me then, they just hired guys.
Woodford: McKenzie could just say, hire that guy.
Brock: [Laughs] Yes, I couldn’t believe it. It wouldn’t happen today, but maybe
something like that might happen at Chicago. I can remember when another student
of David Gale’s was on the market, and Chicago was interested in him. He didn’t
have any economics background either. They were willing to consider him, and
I think that we even made him an offer, though here my memory is poor. But I
remember that there wasn’t any issue about what his degree was in or whether he
was appropriately certified.
Woodford: You were also unusually fortunate, as a math Ph.D. hoping to break
into economics, to have been able to work with David Gale. There are probably
not a lot of people in math departments that are as interested in economics as he
was.
Brock: That’s right. That was key. I would say that Russell Thompson for
mentoring me as an undergraduate, David Gale for mentoring me as a graduate
student, and Lionel McKenzie for mentoring me as a young pup were all key. If it
weren’t for those three guys, I wouldn’t be an economist, probably. They were key.
Woodford: What was it like to join the faculty at the University of Chicago? At
the time, you were probably the only person whose approach to economics was
very mathematical.
Brock: You’re right. That was pretty early. Those were the days of Milton
Friedman and George Stigler, the grand old men of the profession.
Woodford: Did they feel that having a mathematician in the department, or
someone with serious mathematical training, was useful to economics?
Brock: That was hard to figure out. I think it was part of the risk-taking nature
of those guys; they like right-skewness. I got the impression that they thought it
would be fun to have one character, that maybe the department could afford one
real character.
Woodford: So they could at least appreciate the option value.
Brock: Yeah, they saw that there was some option value, even though the mean
was negative, and the variance was extremely large. There was some mass in the
right tail, but it was a risk. [Laughs.]
Yet I think they were supportive, in their own way. A lot of people wouldn’t
think so. I remember that some people in mathematical economics, my own field,
thought that I was somewhat of a traitor, and strange to say the least, to go to a
place like the University of Chicago. But I have always enjoyed taking a risk and
doing the unusual. I enjoy it to this day. I even tried out hang gliding once.
Woodford: When was that?
Brock: That was when I was teaching at Cornell. Another fellow and I went out
and took hang-gliding lessons. I actually did a few flights.
Woodford: How did your career develop from there?
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Brock: Next I was at Rochester. I loved it at Rochester, but then when the
opportunity came to go to Chicago, I just thought it was too good an opportunity
to turn down, just to find out what it was like to be at a place like that. And they take
economics so seriously, though of course Rochester did too. In fact, I don’t think I
have seen two departments anywhere, and I have been in a lot of departments, that
have the degree of seriousness about science that Chicago and Rochester have.
Woodford: How did going to Chicago affect the development of your interests
or your ideas?
Brock: Well, I got interested in monetary theory from having gone to Chicago.
At Rochester, I was interested in turnpike theory, because Lionel [McKenzie] was
there. At Chicago, I got to be fascinated by Milton Friedman’s “optimum quantity
of money.” I thought that it would be interesting to formalize that in the context of
a growth model. So I took the Sidrauski model as a building block, and formalized
the notion of a perfect-foresight equilibrium, which nowadays would be called a
rational point expectation, I suppose.
I got to be fascinated with trying to classify the number of equilibria you could
have in a model like that. You essentially end up with something kind of like a
fixed-point problem, taking a function space to a function space, which locates a
fixed point that solves a differential equation. What was fascinating to me about
that was the number of equilibria that turned up near the full satiety point.
But in those days you were penalized for reporting a large number of equilibria.
The name of the game was to impose discipline on the system. You tried to get rid
of equilibria, not to find as many as you can possibly manufacture. I can imagine
that if a man from Mars came and looked at today’s economics profession, he
would think people were paid a piece rate for the number of equilibria they found.
But in those days you had to pay a fine for each one that you found. So I struggled
mightily to get rid of those things. Of course, I couldn’t, so I reported them in the
paper, and stuck equilibria into various footnotes where they wouldn’t be quite so
prominent, hoping that they wouldn’t alert the notice of the referees. So I finally
got the thing published even though it is filled with equilibria.
Woodford: Did the referees ask you to deemphasize those results?
Brock: Well, I had three referees, and they were almost orthogonal in what they
wanted me to do. So I really felt like I was being pulled in a three-dimensional
vector space, while I only had two dimensions or one dimension to work in, trying
to figure out how to comply. So it was kind of frustrating, but it was published
anyway.1
Woodford: You were involved a lot with optimal growth theory, back in the
1970s.
Brock: That’s right. I got involved with that working with David Gale. David
Gale had a paper with a rather lengthy proof of the existence of an optimal growth
path under the overtaking criterion. I got to looking at that, and I figured out how
to redefine the notion of overtaking so that it wasn’t quite so difficult to work
with mathematically. I called the notion “weakly maximal.” Then one could just
rearrange a bunch of terms involving support prices, and get the infinite series for
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the Ramsey–Weizsacker overtaking ordering; this may or may not be absolutely
convergent, which is a technical problem that causes a major headache trying to
prove theorems in this area.
I figured out2 how to rearrange those terms into the negative of a sum of positive
terms plus a tail. And then if you had a sum of positive terms, you could minimize
the sum of positive terms, and then do something like the Cantor diagonal pro-
cess, to actually construct a minimizer to achieve the infimum of the sum of the
positive terms. Fatou’s lemma lets you exchange the order of the integral and the
limit operations, but you didn’t have that tool available unless the functions were
nonnegative or could be transformed into units where they were. So, recognizing
how to use that tool simplified that proof a lot. And I could control the tail term;
in any candidate optimum you could not diverge much from the steady state, at
least not for too much of the time, if the steady state were unique, because you
would suffer too much loss of value. This was a classical argument that dated back
to Radner, McKenzie, and Gale. And so I could use that to control the tail term.
Then if I could just control the infinite series by the Fatou device, I could simplify
the proof that was one of the major pieces of my thesis.
And then people started using that simplification, and various extensions were
made to it. The Russians got interested in it; Arkin and Evstigneev produced a book
on stochastic optimal growth theory in multisector economies,3 and that device was
used there. It made it a lot easier to prove stochastic analogs of turnpike theorems,
and take care of existence at the same time.
Woodford: What in your view was the most important aim of work on optimal
growth theory? Did you intend it as a theory of long-run economic growth primar-
ily? Or were you simply interested in having a consistent way of thinking about
dynamic issues, broadly speaking, like modeling saving behavior, and investment,
and so on? Another view, probably that of the Russian school, would be that it was
intended to contribute to the theory of economic planning. What was your point
of view?
Brock: At first I think I simply had the posture of the mathematician, who was
just interested in how to solve technical problems, but then I learned more about
economics, after about a year or two at Rochester. I just sort of learned economics,
not only by teaching but essentially by tormenting the faculty, asking people like
Sherwin Rosen, and anybody else I could get my hands on, dozens of economics
questions, until they got exhausted from constant questioning. Then I got fascinated
with the idea that these models could be looked upon much like you do in welfare
economics, where if markets bring about a Pareto optimum, there will be an as-if
maximization problem, a certain sum of utilities that the equilibrium acts as if it
is maximizing. I got interested in that kind of thing, and using the models as tools
to study competitive equilibrium.
Woodford: So they could model how competitive equilibria unfold over time.
Brock: I wrote a little thing as a discussion of a paper by Roy Radner. I think this
was at the Toronto Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, in 1972.4 It was
early in the morning and the audience seemed kind of drowsy, so I decided to do
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something crazy. And so I took the neoclassical stochastic growth model that I was
working on with Mirman, and said, let’s think of this as a competitive equilibrium
for an economy. What would it look like? You would see random movements in
capital and consumption, et cetera. And maybe that would look like something
bad, but it’s a competitive equilibrium, so it’s Pareto optimal; you can’t beat it.
And I didn’t think that was exciting enough to wake up the audience, so I
proceeded to show how Marx’s labor theory of value breaks down in a world
like this. I said, recall the nonsubstitution theorem, for multifactor setups with
one primary factor of production, no joint production, and so on. In that equilib-
rium the relative price of goods would be the relative congealed labor contents.
I showed that the analog of that in the deterministic growth model is that the
capital–labor ratio in steady state depends only on the subjective rate of time dis-
count on the future utility. It doesn’t depend on any parameters of the period utility
function.
But that’s all for the case of certainty. In the stochastic growth model, parameters
of the utility function all get wadded up into the stochastic steady state. So there is
the end of the labor theory of value. And, I think I made some smart-aleck remark
about Marx not having thought about that, and its striking a gaping hole in his
theory, but I still don’t think I was successful in waking up the audience at that
time in the day.
I thought that was fascinating. There were a bunch of other people, too, of
course—Lucas, Prescott, the rational expectations literature, and so on—but I was
too na¨ıve to understand what I was doing, and that these things were all related.
Woodford: Your model with Mirman5 was subsequently invoked as providing
the foundations for the kind of stochastic growth model used in real business-cycle
theory. Was that the sort of application you had in mind at the time?
Brock: I hadn’t really thought of that at the time. You know, I wish I had thought
of that. I had thought of it in terms of decentralization of an optimal allocation—
that you could manufacture a competitive equilibrium, kind of like in the classical
papers of Debreu, where you maximize a weighted sum of utilities subject to a
bunch of constraints, and then under the right kinds of assumptions, you could
manufacture competitive equilibria corresponding to the optimization problems.
I thought, well, you could do that in infinite-dimensional spaces, too; isn’t that
neat. But those guys were really clever in recognizing that you could actually do
business-cycle theory using that kind of model as the base. Maybe Mirman might
have thought of it, but I was still muddling around in pure mathematics.
Woodford: You have since then gotten very interested in nonlinear dynamics
in economics.
Brock: Yes. I would like to think of that as a continuation of the theme of my
research, although I’m sure a lot of outsiders don’t look at it that way. Because
my research started out by locating sufficient conditions for stability in hetero-
geneous capital goods models, and that problem still fascinates me to this day.
The basic idea of that work was that, if you have enough market completeness,
so that you can do enough smoothing across time and space, and if people don’t
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discount the future very much, then you can essentially adapt value-loss-type argu-
ments to argue that the economy can’t spend too much time away from the maximal
steady-state point, or its stochastic analog. I was just fascinated with those kinds of
technical problems, and also thought that they had some importance in understand-
ing the forces that dampen economic instability. And then it was natural, having
studied one side of the problem, to look at the flip side: what are the sources for
instability?
I wrote a paper that was a lecture at the 1975 World Congress of the Econometric
Society,6 where I discussed the engineering literature on optimal linear regulator
problems. I had taught a course on this when I first started teaching at Chicago,
and showed students how you could borrow useful techniques from this literature
in engineering. You have a set of differential equations that are like
dx/dt = Fx + Gu,
whereu is your control, and you have payoffs likex′Qx+ u′Ru, whereQ andR
are positive-definite matrices, and you want to minimize the undiscounted sum of
payoffs. That’s the engineer’s problem. The economist maximizes the discounted
sum of course, but you can make a change in the units and absorb the discount
factor in theF matrix of the differential equation, and then directly apply the
standard results.
So you can see exactly what the forces for stability are by looking at the engi-
neering literature: low discounting, large enough eigenvalues of theQ andG R−1G
matrices, and enough inherent stability in your underlying dynamics defined by
the F matrix. For example, if theF matrix is stable, then you’ve got to work to
destabilize the system by applying costly control. So you can start to understand
from these linear dynamics the forces that cause local instability. You can think
of the engineering literature as a kind of a linear-quadratic approximation to a
nonlinear system. And if instead of doing the usual thing of linearizing and look-
ing at eigenvalues, you do a linear-quadratic approximation and then look at the
resulting optimal linear regulator problem, you can tune your mind to find not only
the forces for stability, but also the forces for instability.
So you start looking at the elements, and you start getting an understanding of
what the forces of stability and instability are, what the economic trade-offs are.
My work in the 1970’s, with Scheinkman, Mirman, Majumdar, and Magill—I hope
I’m not forgetting anyone, because I worked with so many people on this—was
mostly focusing on the forces of stability, which was sort of considered the name
of the game then. I find it a bit odd, but it was kind of understood in the 1970’s
that forces for instability were everywhere. The hard mathematical problem was
finding sufficient conditions on utilities and the dynamics so that in the face of
heterogeneous goods—because there were a lot of interactions, complementari-
ties, substitutabilities, etc., that would lead to forces for instability—it was sort
of thought in those days that the analytic and intellectual challenge was to find
sufficient conditions for stability.
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FIGURE 2. From left to right, Mukul Majumdar, Tapan Mitra, Jos´e Scheinkman, Lionel
McKenzie, and Buz Brock, during summer 1975, at a conference on capital theory at
Minary Conference Center, Dartmouth College, Squam Lake, New Hampshire.
Woodford: But when you say that it was understood that forces for instability
were everywhere, do you think that it was believed that in practice the forces for
instability were important? Or was it simply a challenge to get the mathematics
to align with people’s economic intuition, which was that the forces for instability
were trivial in practice?
Brock: Yes, I think that in Chicago people thought the forces for stability
were very strong, and that kind of fits in with the philosophy of the place. For a
mathematical person like Lionel McKenzie, I think his focus on the challenging
mathematics probably made him nervous about being too religious about making
any arguments for the stability of capitalism. And then for guys like Arrow and
Hahn, Quirk and Saposnick, and so on, in general equilibrium theory, well, they
knew that it was a nightmare of instability—Scarf’s example and all that. And
those of us working in heterogeneous-capital-goods optimal growth theory felt
that the same threat was there for us too. So the hard mathematical problem was
to find sufficient conditions for stability, especially global stability.
Woodford: Because it was believed that finding counterexamples to the stability
results would be easy.
Brock: That’s right. That’s the mathematician’s attitude. When you’re reared
as a graduate student in mathematics, at least at Berkeley, the first thing that
you’re taught is how to find counterexamples. Like a function that’s continuous
everywhere but differentiable nowhere; that’s the kind of stuff you cut your teeth
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on, how to find examples of nonmeasurable sets. Gelbaum and Olmsted’s book,
Counterexamples in Analysis,7 was popular with us grad students. So we all took
it for granted that this is an easy game to play. What’s hard is to find a robust
set of sufficient conditions that are kind of surprising, that deliver a surprising
conclusion.
Woodford: So you weren’t surprised at all that later authors could demonstrate
the possibility of nonconvergence to a turnpike in optimal growth models?
Brock: That would be the attitude of the mathematician, but not the attitude of
an economist, because what the economist is after are substantive issues. But from
the point of view of the mathematician, sort of flexing his mathematical muscles,
one would not be so excited. The mathematician would be more excited with the
theorem that just struck him as having a conclusion that was surprising, and with
why a particular sufficient condition, through a rather long chain of reasoning,
would lead to this conclusion.
Woodford: Do you have a view about how the literature has come out, in terms
of whether we should view the turnpike theorems as telling us the economically
important results about dynamic competitive systems, or whether the things that
have been learned about conditions that can give rise to instability should bulk
larger in people’s view of what we understand about the dynamics of competitive
economies?
Brock: I think what you learn out of the turnpike literature, and out of general
equilibrium theory, and so on, though you probably couldn’t prove this as a math-
ematical theorem, is that stability is pretty robust. I mean that you can find useful
sufficient conditions for stability that make economic sense. You can prove it if
you assume complete markets, and so on, though of course nobody believes that.
But even with incomplete markets, there are arguments like those of Ehrlich and
Becker, or Bewley’s discussion of the permanent-income hypothesis, where you
can sort of do homemade market completion. Intuitively, with more and more mar-
ket completion, and longer-lived agents that could borrow and lend to get around
liquidity constraints, like the stuff that you looked at, for example, well, then, that
would argue for stability.
Of course, there are technical problems, like if one person discounts the future
less than everybody else, and acts like a Saudi Arabian dynasty thinking ahead 900
years, rather than thinking ahead a short time as Americans are often characterized.
You can show then that that guy will end up with all of the capital, which is a kind
of stability, but maybe not a desirable one. [Laughs.] I used to think that Japan
would end up with all the world’s capital because of their high savings rates,
especially if you were to complete the markets more, so that we can borrow even
more from them. Then we should become more and more indebted—in fact we
should become indebted at a more and more rapid rate—as the Japanese end up
not only owning all of our capital, but also the present value of our future labor
productivity and future human capital productivity. Of course it didn’t quite work
out that way.
Woodford: That fate seems less of a threat now.
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Brock: This points to the importance of institutions. I also did work on political
economy and institutions, and you never want to forget that when you’re doing
mathematical economics. Government matters, the Fed matters, institutions matter,
and all these things can work to support or counteract the forces for stability. They
can generate a lot of instability, like through poorly managed banking regulations.
Woodford: What is your view of the importance for economics of the idea of
chaotic dynamics? I know that you were interested for a while in studying chaotic
systems.
Brock: That’s one of those things where, in my heart of hearts, when I started
looking at chaotic dynamics, being from Chicago and Rochester I didn’t think that
there was any chance of chaotic dynamics. But being a scientist, I felt that one
should test, rather than just simply make an ideological statement about it.
So Dee Dechert, Jos´e [Scheinkman], and I got involved in this project of testing,
and we cooked up statistical methods to test for chaos.8 Well, it’s not really a “test”
of chaos, of course, but at any rate it’s an indicator consistent with chaos and other
“deep” nonlinearities of that kind. I would say the evidence for low-dimensional
deterministic chaos in economic and financial data is pretty weak. I know that
there are authors that have said the contrary; time will tell. Of course, the world
has got to be high-dimensionally chaotic, in some philosophical sense. But you
know, I don’t think anybody will ever invent statistical methods that are precise
enough, on machines with finite resolution and with finite data sets, to ferret out a
high-dimensional, highly irregular chaos, as opposed to pure randomness. That’s
a tough problem.
Woodford: And it may not matter to us, even in principle, to know the difference
between these two descriptions of the world.
Brock: That’s right. I think the reason why people got so fascinated with this was
that it was kind of like breaking a secret code or something. If, say, six-dimensional
chaos is generating the data that you see, there is the potential of being able to
reconstruct that chaos and forecast much better.
Woodford: Better, you mean, than with a linear statistical model.
Brock: That’s right. I think that’s inherently just a beautiful problem. I do have a
little bit of the attitude of the mathematician; I think it was Andre Weil of Princeton,
who said, “If it’s beautiful, it must be useful.” And this stuff is just so beautiful
that a person has to play with it.
And I think one of the prettiest things that we got, besides the central limit
theorem, was the following. Suppose you estimate a process of the form
yt = f (xt ,θ)+ εt ,
whereyt is observable data,xt is a vector of observables,θ is a vector of parameters,
andεt is i.i.d. error. Then, as long asθ can be estimated
√
n-consistently, the first-
order asymptotics of our statistic are invariant to estimation error. This usually
doesn’t happen, but there is a mathematical symmetry in this statistic that we
constructed that worked to allow us to get this result. This is pretty.
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And even though the evidence for chaos turned out to be pretty minimal, in my
opinion, the statistic itself has been used by all kinds of people for all different
kinds of tasks. Everything from specification testing of GARCH models to doing
specification testing in general, or just testing for nonforecastable nonstationarities
that may not have been recognized, or testing for nonlinearities or other structure
that has been left out. It’s used for nonlinear models that people fit in data, and
people have adapted it to cross sections as well as time series. So I think it’s one
of those things that ended up producing a useful tool, whether it had anything to
do with chaos or not. It turns out that our test has high power against chaos, but it
has high power against a lot of other stuff too.
Woodford: Setting aside the issue of deterministic chaos, do you think that the
search for nonlinear structure in economic systems is important? Or would your
conjecture tend to be that linear approximations probably describe most of what’s
important about the dynamics of economic systems?
Brock: Well, that is a tough one too. It is very hard to beat a linear process out of
sample, in many contexts in economics. If you condition on the right statistics, like
volume movements and past volatility movements, people like [Blake] LeBaron
have shown that you can actually beat a linear model or a random-walk model or a
simple martingale-difference sequence model in finance. But, in general, it is hard
to beat linear models out of sample.
I think part of the reason for that is the noisiness of the data in macro, especially
if you don’t have enough observations or the data are not disaggregated enough.
I have seen studies where if you go to lower levels of aggregation, you will find
asymmetric movements across the business cycle that are not consistent with a
vector autoregression model. If I have a VAR system of the form
xt+1 = Axt + εt+1,
and if the errorsεt+1 are symmetrically distributed, then asymmetries in the output
seriesxt are not consistent with such a model. People have detected a fair amount
of evidence for asymmetries, like unemployment rates that tend to shoot up fast
during a recession and dribble down slowly. I have seen stuff like that. I have also
seen things that document other business-cycle asymmetries if you go down to
lower levels of aggregation. I don’t know how good the evidence is for that, but I
think it is important to document whether they are there or not. It could have an
impact on how we view the economy.
It is certainly known that recessions are shorter than expansions: People have
shown that post-WWII expansions are roughly 4 times longer than recessions,
and the duration of an expansion when you condition on its length seems to be
independent of its length. This kind of nonlinear thinking sort of propels you into
asking questions about asymmetries, which I think is healthy for the profession,
especially in macro, which I think is sometimes a bit too log-linear for its own
intellectual health.
You don’t want to close off a line of inquiry prematurely. I think the profession
can afford a few people experimenting. You know, it’s very much like the multiarm
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bandit problem, where if you are discounting the future, you can get stopped
on the wrong machine, and it could happen with a very substantial probability,
even though you are doing optimal learning. Whereas, if you don’t discount the
future—and I don’t think that science should discount the future, or at least not
very much—then you should always sample that other machine, even though it
looks bad right now, on a sparse set of times. So to a certain extent, some of this
exotic stuff in economic science, like chaos, should be studied for that reason.
I don’t even think nonlinearity in general is that exotic, because if you look at
the microlabor literature, those guys are completely nonlinear. They can’t under-
stand what the fuss is about. I don’t think any microeconomist would even ask
questions about nonlinearity; to them it is just a matter of common sense. But
the macro people, I think, are working with data of less quality. One thing I have
noticed, having worked in a lot of fields, is that the better the data quality in the
field, the less argument there is about high-technology methods, such as testing
for nonlinearities, or using neural networks or looking for chaos, all of that kind of
stuff.
And in the financial field, which has to meet the bottom line, there wasn’t any
argument at all. They just simply took the stuff. I have lectured on Wall Street and
found working papers sitting on the desk in the anteroom while waiting to go in
to lecture. For these people, if there is any argument, they simply try it and if it
works, it is part of the tool kit bag. And if it doesn’t they throw it out; that’s it.
Woodford: Do you think that they are interested because they see that it works,
or because the high payoff in their field to having something before anyone else
makes them willing to try out even exotic strategies?
Brock: I think they know what it is they are doing. Their goal functions are very
precise. That might be a better way of putting it. In the case of finance it is profit,
but even in that maligned institution, government—and I have worked in quite a
few government sectors, not only here but in New Zealand and in Australia—when
you are working for an arm of the government, like the Federal Trade Commission
or the Department of Justice, you know exactly what it is you are to be doing,
much more precisely than when you’re trying to get a paper published in a journal
like Econometrica. You know that they want you to know how the system works,
because if they conduct the policy and it doesn’t work, and if what you told them
turned out to be wrong, they are liable to be left twisting in the wind. So there
is a strong incentive to understand how the system works, even if they might be
politically opposed to what you are telling them. Because that will just give them a
better set of arguments to advance their political position, so even there I felt I had
a much better idea what I was trying to do. My job was to understand the system
the best I could, and report accordingly.
Things are different in science. Durlauf and I wrote a humorous little paper9 on
the economics of science, where we had scientists getting paid off if their theories
predict better out of sample than rivals’, but also being punished if they deviated
from their reference group. And we worked this out using a little social-interaction
model that we were working on. You can get alternative stable states in these kinds
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of models, where, in order to survive you have to affiliate yourself with a school
as it were, and if you deviate from that school you get punished.
Woodford: You think that this is more of a problem in science than it is in
business or government?
Brock: I think so. Because in business you have to meet the bottom line, period,
or you are going to be put out of business by someone who does. And in government,
you have to understand the system; if you tell people stuff that later turns out to be
false, your reputation goes through the halls of the world’s governments as being
incompetent, and then you are out of business as a government consultant. I’m
stating the thing starkly; of course, the real world is not that stark. But I think
the direction of what I just said was right relative to academia, where the force of
performance-based evaluation on a concrete performance metric isn’t so strong.
Woodford: You have recently gotten interested in modeling bounded rationality.
Brock: Yes, see, there again for the outsider it looks as though this guy is
running off on tangents again, but let’s go back to the beginning. I got fascinated
with stability, and developed a bunch of mathematical models and instruments to
help me understand the forces of stability, and I got a pretty good grip on that. Then
I wanted to know what forces caused instability; they certainly looked like they
could be there: incomplete markets, liquidity constraints, institutional breakdowns,
et cetera. So then what kind of evidence is there for stability, what kind of evidence
is there for instability? It actually forces you to econometric methods, and in macro
it’s going to be time series.
And so then I got interested in testing methods for the most unstable form
of instability you can think of, which is deterministic chaos, or noise-perturbed
deterministic chaos, since nobody in economics, especially in finance, is nutty
enough to believe that financial markets can be deterministic. Nobody believes
that. But the issue is, could there be a noise-contaminated deterministic mechanism
such that when you shut off the noise, it has enough nonlinearity in it to generate
some fluctuations on its own. Intelligent people have asked questions like that.
Even people like Keynes talked about things like that. So it’s a legitimate question
to ask. That got me interested in the work that I did with Dechert, Scheinkman and
LeBaron. David Hsieh, [Blake] LeBaron, and I wrote a book for the MIT Press,10
where we tried to set this type of econometric method in with the broad field of
time-series econometrics.
And so, in searching for evidence of instability, the natural thing to do is to
look to see if there is left-out structure in the residuals of standard models, such
as a VAR in the case of macro data. And then we ended up defining notions of
linearity. That turned out to be a nontrivial technical problem in the stochastic
setting, because every stationary process has a Wold representation where the
errors are uncorrelated. So we defined notions of linearity, like “i.i.d. linearity,”
that you can test—assuming regularity conditions, of course. A series is i.i.d.
linear if it has a Wold representation with i.i.d. errors. But that’s too strong a
notion for finance, because everyone knows about heteroskedasticity in finance.
So we cooked up a notion that we called “MDS linearity,” and that’s a Wold
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representation with martingale difference sequence errors. The BDS statistic that
Dechert, Scheinkman, and I cooked up turns out to be ideal for testing for i.i.d.
linearity. But that is too strong a null hypothesis for finance. But then for MDS
linearity, you can parameterize the martingale difference sequence—the GARCH
literature is one way of doing that—and have ultimate i.i.d. drivers. So you can
estimate the parameterized form of the MDS, suck out estimates of the ultimate
i.i.d. drivers, and testthemfor independence. It turns out that you can adapt the
BDS method for doing that.
That work was asking, is there anything else in economic data besides the so-
called received theory, which are more or less variations on linearist methods:
a Wold representation with a type of nonlinearity in the martingale difference
sequence, but that still looks very linear. You could think of it as linear in conditional
volatility rather than linear in the conditional mean. It was running into statistical
problems carrying out that program that drove Lakonishok, Lebaron, and me to
invent what we think is a more sophisticated method for testing for departures
from conventional models in time-series data. That was ourJ nal of Finance
paper in December 1992,11 which got used a lot, as I understand, by practitioners.
The idea there is that you take any trading method used by practitioners. We
focused on technical trading rules, but it does not have to be; it could be fun-
damentalist trading rules. You take the rule that looks like it might be of use to
practitioners, and you take any received “law” that is strongly defended by a school
of economics, like in the Brock and Durlauf paper, by a powerful school. So we
took a GARCH model as our received model that is going to be the null hypothe-
sis. Estimate the received model on data; then bootstrap trading-rule performance
statistics. So on each pass through the bootstrap, you buy when the rule says to
buy, then you hold for so many periods, close out the position, and compute the
conditional mean and the conditional variance following the buy signal. This gives
you two statistics. Compute the conditional mean and conditional variance follow-
ing the sell signal. This gives you two other statistics. Then compute the profits
from this trading rule, giving you five statistics altogether. You can essentially
form a multidimensional histogram of these five statistics.
Recompute the same five statistics for your data, and tick off a rejection region
or report ap value. I prefer to reportp values under the null, and let the readers
make up their own minds whether the evidence is compelling or not. If you get
a small p value of the null, reject the null hypothesis. Now the benefit of this
procedure over what I’ll call conventional econometrics—maximum likelihood
estimation, GMM, extremal estimators, and the like—is that those methods are
not really tailor-made to the application in question. The statistics ground out by
those methods have nothing to do with the objectives of the players.
Woodford: In a sense, you want to test the rational expectations model by asking
if people should learn to have those expectations.
Brock: Yes. I like the self-referential or self-consistent feature of this approach,
that the statistics were directly related to the objectives of the players that we were
trying to model, and that the conventional model purports to model. And then the
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bootstrap is available, so why not use it? Analytically, asymptotics for these kinds
of statistics are beyond reach, but who cares? Under Moore’s law, with the rapidly
declining cost of computation, ....
Woodford: You may as well do Monte Carlo studies.
Brock: Yes. So you use the bootstrap, and then there is a rigorous statistical
theory worked out for the bootstrap. It has its own central-limit-type results for
consistency under the null and so on. Now we couldn’t use any of those results after
doing extensive literature research, but you can use the computer instead. What
you do is generate a sample of say 100,000 observations from your favorite null
model. Then you pretend that you are these three statisticians, Brock, Lakonishok,
and LeBaron, going through their procedure for a sample of length 1,000, 2,000,
3,000 under the null, and see if their five bootstrap histograms converge, by the
size of sample length that they actually have. While our available sample length
was 2,000 for all of the subsets of data we looked at, the thing appeared to converge
around 500 or so. So that is a kind of “computer” proof of consistency, that it was
usablyconsistent.
Woodford: So you show not just asymptotic convergence, but even with the
length of sample that you have, which is a more usable result.
Brock: There are a lot of statistics used out there that converge so slowly, even
though econometricians have proved asymptotic theorems, that are useless. So I
see all of this as part of an applied project of trying to understand patterns that I see
in the economy, which may be driven by stabilizing forces or destabilizing forces
that may or may not be captured in the profession’s received models. We invented
these methods to look for departures from those received models. And then that
drove me to look at bounded rationality, because we saw so many departures in
the financial area. And trading volume seemed way too huge to be consistent with
everybody having the same expectations and common knowledge, given the no-
trade theorems, et cetera. So I wanted to understand what is causing the departures
from the received theory, that I know and love and contributed to as well.
Woodford: And your working hypothesis about the nature of the more adequate
theory is that it would involve departures from rational expectations?
Brock: That’s a tough question. I can tell you how we’re approaching it. We
developed a general theory with Darwinistic selection-type forces over a space of
expectational types, and rational expectations is just one of the types. And then
within this general theory, you can work out competitive equilibrium, and get
restrictions on the data, which you can test using the generalized instrumental
variables literature, Hansen-Singletonet alia, that were invented in the context of
testing rational expectations models. We have been able to carry out the econo-
metric part of that program, in the sense of generating a theoretical framework so
that we can copy a lot of these econometric techniques.
A student of mine, Saangjoon Baak, has carried out one paper12 which extends
the Rosen, Murphy, and Scheinkman cattle-cycle paper, that assumed rational ex-
pectations. Baak set up a general model with two kinds of ranchers: Rosen-Murphy-
Scheinkman ranchers and backward-looking ranchers. It was linear-quadratic, so
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you could solve for equilibrium, and then he applied some of the technology of
Anderson, Hansen, Sargent, and McGrattan.
Woodford: This is their chapter in theHandbook of Computational Economics?13
Brock: That’s right. So that was the perfect framework for him to use, and he
tested for the significance of the extra parameters resulting from the addition of
the boundedly rational ranchers to the model. Within that context, he accepted the
hypothesis that the boundedly rational ranchers were there, and something like
25% or 30% of them were boundedly rational. Then he looked at another type
of backward-looking expectations that is more rational. It is called “quasi-rational
expectations,” and it is due to Marc Nerlove. The idea is that you form expectations
that are consistent with past autocorrelation functions, but you don’t assume that
the rancher knows the structure of the world he is living in. So this is a halfway
house. As you might expect, the likelihood function liked the Nerlove hypothesis
better than a stupid backward-looking boundedly rational rancher. About 70% or
so were estimated to be Nerlovians in that version of the model.
Woodford: Although it was still important, even so, to allow a part of the
population to have rational expectations.
Brock: Exactly, even in the Nerlove case, it looked like about 30% or so. And
then a colleague of mine, Jean-Paul Chavas, who teaches in the agricultural eco-
nomics department here, has a different technique, more of a GMM-type technique,
but addressed himself to the same problem. I think that he might have looked at
cattle too, though I’m not so sure about the cattle, but I know he looked at pork.14
And he found a roughly similar percentage of boundedly rational agents. I think
he looked at Nerlovians too, so it’s encouraging that the two parties used differ-
ent methods and got rough agreement, though like in most kinds of econometric
results, it is really rough. Anyone who does empirical work will be sympathetic
to what I am talking about here, how you have to take each result with extreme
caution. But I think the general strategy is sound, of laying out a framework that
includes versions of rational expectations nested within the framework, and do-
ing the theory in such a way that you can use received econometrics, generalized
instrumental variables and the like, and then let the data speak to whether the
expectations are rational or not, rather than imposing it.
Woodford: This sounds to a large extent like a continuation of the kind of
research that was being done prior to the advent of rational expectations, notably by
Nerlove but also by others, where there were attempts to econometrically estimate
models that included explicit models of the expectations, in terms of some kind of
backward-looking expectations.
Brock: That’s right, those guys would look at things like distributed lags, and
that was very popular.
Woodford: What you’re doing is of course a more sophisticated version of those
specifications, but it would seem to be in the same spirit.
Brock: I think that it has a somewhat similar spirit, in the sense that rational
expectations didn’t really exist when those guys were working. That was invented
later, and then econometric methods were developed to do inference and testing
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FIGURE 3. Tap dancing at the Economics Department holiday party, University of
Wisconsin—Madison, December 1998. Photo by Niemke Oomes.
in the framework of rational expectations. Now at last we have enough tools
out there and enough theory developed, where I think we can now develop a
framework where we let the data speak to whether the expectations are rational
or not. You still have a lot of tough econometric compromises that you have to
make in order to carry out such a program, like assuming stationarity. I know
people who would rather commit suicide than assume stationarity, and there are
issues of detrending, whether you work in a difference-stationary framework or a
trend-stationary framework, et cetera.
Woodford: But those complications aren’t special to the nature of your hypoth-
esis.
Brock: That’s right. We are carrying out a similar program in finance as well,
and what is handy in finance is that volume data is very powerful in slicing across
different classes of models. Because even in noisy rational expectations models,
you get positive volume in those models, but you can ask about the pattern of
reversion of volume to a long-run level, and how long it takes for it to revert to
a long-run level. This can give you some idea of how much heterogeneity there
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might be in expectations above and beyond signal heterogeneity in the context of
noisy rational expectations models.
That’s where I am now, working on this bounded rationality program. I’m work-
ing with a really excellent young scholar named Cars Hommes, at the University
of Amsterdam, who just received an award from the Dutch government to set up
a center where he could do experimental work as well. He has ideas on how to
do laboratory experiments on expectations, as well as carry out our research pro-
gram on what you might call general theories of expectations formation. We call
it “evolutive economic dynamics,” where rational expectations plays a major role
because it is nested within the general evolutive theory of expectations formation.
Woodford: But the empirical strategy that you have described doesn’t directly
really model this evolutionary process though, does it? You only mentioned esti-
mation of fractions of the population that form expectations in various ways.
Brock: Yes, it does. What we have is a discrete-choice model where each agent
in the model solves a discrete-choice problem, as in the work of McFadden and
Manski, or Rust, and Honor´e, over a population of possible predictors or expecta-
tional trading strategies. How the mass of traders move across these expectational
trading strategies depends on performance, so that as profits or losses roll into
each strategy, the mass of traders moves across the space of such strategies. The
“intensity of choice” in McFadden-Manski terminology determines how fast they
move in response to profit differentials from different strategies.
Woodford: So the fraction of the population with different strategies is changing
over a timescale that is short relative to your sample?
Brock: Exactly, and that makes executing an econometric inference strategy
difficult. Because in the work that I mentioned by Baak and Chavas, what they
basically did was to assume that there is just a fixed fraction in each type.
Woodford: So there is no evolution in those models.
Brock: And so they tested a null hypothesis that the fraction is 100% in rational
expectations, against the alternative that there is a positive fraction who use some
boundedly rational rule. But in the full endogenous theory that Hommes and I have
developed—we have one paper inEconometrica,15 another one in theJournal of
Economic Dynamics and Control,16 and there are a couple of others forthcoming—
all of those have endogenous evolution of the probabilities across strategies over
time. We explore sources of stability or instability in that context, and one of the
important parameters is the sensitivity or intensity of choice. In other words, if you
had a population of people that are highly sensitive to the slightest advantage, then
that could even lead to instability, because all of the traders will sort of switchen
massefrom one strategy to another in response to a very small profit differential.
Woodford: And a small apparent differential of that kind could occur by
accident.
Brock: That’s right, and that would make the system lurch from one place to
another. It’s like they are all highly tuned—“Chicago”-style—to the tiniest differ-
ence in incentives; then the herd can just moveen masse, rather like Samuelson’s
boat. You know the parable of Samuelson’s boat?
INTERVIEW WITH WILLIAM A. BROCK 127
Woodford: No.
Brock: I think this is from Paul Samuelson. A bunch of people are on a long
linear boat, and they are whale watching. Somebody yells “Whale!” on the right
of the boat, and they all run to the right side, and the boat starts to sink. They all
panic and so all run to the left side. But now they are all on the left side, and the
boat sinks even more. This system has an unstable eigenvalue in discrete time,
going through−1.
You can get similar waves of movement across expectational strategies in our
evolutionary models. Profits are all over here, then vroom! they all go over there.
So this lurching back and forth between expectational types can be rather unstable.
Woodford: That’s a pretty alarming picture of the functioning of markets.
Brock: Of course, the instability only occurs if the intensity of choice is large
enough. If the intensity of choice is low, then the people would act more randomly
and be more uniformly distributed across the boat. Some would probably go to see
the whale, but others would stay put, and then the system would not be destabilized.
I like this as a metaphor to make the point that if you have high intensity of
choice across different expectational strategies, then when it looks like there is
an advantage to using rational expectations, even after you pay the higher costs,
then everybody would start using rational expectations. But then all the rent would
disappear to rational expectations, and their costs would not be covered. And then
everybody would try to get by using cheaper expectations and avoid those costs.
This way you could generate instability with high enough intensity of choice.
Woodford: The parable seems to depend not just on a strong enough intensity
of choice, a strong enough response to changes in forecasts, but also on a high
degree of synchronization in people’s reactions. The time lag in the reaction has
to be the same for this whole group of people.
Brock: That’s right. Replacing synchronous updating with asynchronous up-
dating would dampen such a force. I actually think this problem infects much
of economic dynamics, including the “sunspots” literature. Why would everyone
synchronously lock onto the same sunspot, and why wouldn’t something like the
law of large numbers squish such effects? I tried to deal with this problem inEstu-
dios Economicos17 by proposing a framework that joins tools from discrete-choice
econometrics and statistical physics, where complementarities across agents are
strong enough that the law of large numbers fails and “clumping,” rather like asyn-
chronous updating, occurs. Then the force comes back again. It’s like a little bit of
“Yale sociology economics” plus a lot of “Chicago sharp-response-to-incentives
economics” leads to a breakdown of the law of large numbers, so you don’t get
the “washout effect” that you were alluding to anymore.
Anyway, abstracting from that problem, it’s rather like the Grossman-Stiglitz
information paradox, but dynamized. Those guys argued that if everybody was
using rational expectations and they were costly to obtain, then it wouldn’t pay
me to buy into rational expectations. I would use na¨ıve expectations, especially
if the system had settled down to some kind of stable state, because you don’t
need sophisticated expectations to predict next period’s state of the system when
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it is not changing every much. But if nobody used rational expectations, then in a
situation where na¨ıve expectations was locally unstable, like a supply-and-demand
situation where the elasticity of supply is greater then the elasticity of demand—a
hog-cycle situation, for example—you could get instability of the following type.
If everybody uses na¨ıve expectations, say backward-looking expectations, then
you get something like an unstable hog cycle. Then if that instability grew, it would
be worth my while to buy into rational expectations, even though they are costly,
because I can cover those costs with the extra profits I can make by more accurately
forecasting those fluctuations. But then when those fluctuations died down, again
it wouldn’t be worth my while, and the whole story would repeat.
Note that you really need two forces to generate this kind of instability. One is
that a steady state is locally unstable under na¨ıve expectations, and on the other
hand, the intensity of choice has to be high enough to get a “Samuelson’s boat”-type
phenomenon across expectational strategies.
Woodford: So greater sophistication, in the sense of responding rapidly to
changes in the incentives to use more sophisticated kinds of forecasting, is actually
a force for instability.
Brock: That’s right. It could happen and that was what Hommes and I showed
in ourEconometricaarticle.
Woodford: Is this something that you think is more likely to be a serious problem
as financial market participants become more sophisticated?
Brock: It could be. A student of mine, Patrick de Fontnouvelle, re-did the stuff
that Hommes and I did in the context of “noisy rational expectations” models
where it is possible to get more precise signals.18 If everybody buys into more
precise signals, then there is not enough rent to cover the cost of purchasing more
precise signals. So more of the traders purchase coarse signals, and then, even
though you get a martingale difference sequence for returns, it is more variable
because people are not purchasing as accurate a signal. So you get phases. A de
Fontnouvelle system runs through these phases where signals are quite tight for a
while, and then they are quite loose, and then they are quite tight again. The logic
of it is very much like a conjunction of the logic of my paper with Hommes and
the old Grossman-Stiglitz information paradox.
Woodford: Is it your view that this kind of instability in the way people are form-
ing expectations is something one should be able to see occurring over relatively
short timescales, that in actual data that we would see the dynamics unfolding?
Brock: I think so. We’ve got a project where we are trying to use data on what
fraction of stock market investors are in index funds. Our idea is to study volatility
and transactions volume, and what the implications would be if the entire market
was in index funds and didn’t do security analysis at all. My conjecture is that
observed variations in volatility and volume may be due to changes in the number
of traders using different types of expectational strategies. But that hasn’t gotten
very far yet.
Woodford: Your perspective seems to be quite different from much recent work
on bounded rationality. Many people propose to use models of bounded rationality
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as a way of selecting among equilibria, still assuming that the rational expectations
equilibria (or Bayesian Nash equilibria) are the things that one would actually see.
An equilibrium would still be the prediction of the model, once one selected the
right one.
Brock: Yes, I am much more interested in the kind of logical inconsistency em-
bodied in the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox, and how it might show up in actual data,
as people oscillate between patterns of behavior that are each self-contradictory,
rather than ever reaching an equilibrium at all.
We have a project where my co-authors and I plan to test the implications of
those kinds of theories on volume and volatility data. The idea is very much like the
original rational expectations literature, where you get orthogonality restrictions
imposed by full rational expectations, and then you test those restrictions using
generalized instrumental variables methods, like Hansen and Singleton did. What
we do is nest the conventional rational expectations theory in this larger structure
where evolutive pressures unfold over time, and then set up a nested econometric
framework to test whether the extra parameters, indicating the presence of the
boundedly rational players or the coarser-signal players, are significant.
Woodford: Have you talked to actual traders in financial markets at all about
these ideas?
Brock: Well, [Allan] Kleidon and I wrote a paper19 on bid-ask spreads at the
open and close of trading, and he actually spent time on the floor of the New
York Stock Exchange in one of their visitors’ programs. And I have also discussed
this kind of thing in lectures to financial types. And some of my associates that
have been here are actually working for trading houses now. I don’t think I should
identify the firms, but I think the ideas are being explored.
Woodford: And do they find that this idea of dynamics in the way people try to
get information and try to forecast the market is actually realistic? Is it helpful in
understanding things that they see happening?
Brock: Well, so much of their work is proprietary. But I guess all of these guys
are highly competitive. I know that some firms talk like they believe the markets
are highly heterogeneous, and they believe there are hierarchies of expectation
formations at different timescales, and that this generates something like scaling
laws. Some of them got very interested in the work that Lakonishok, LeBaron,
and I did, that we talked about earlier. This method can allow them to detect
systematically departures from a null model, which could be their own trading
model, and then repair it so that it predicts out of sample better.
Woodford: Is there a problem of internal inconsistency of your model that
comes from the fact that if people understand it, then that will in fact undermine
the validity of the model itself?
Brock: Well, I think in the signal version of the model, the version with noisy
rational expectations, it is harder to undermine it. It is always tricky, though,
when you get into these common-knowledge situations. I have never been able to
completely solve the Townsend-type problem of expectations of expectations, to
keep everything consistent in a common-knowledge framework. It was partly in
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response to the difficulty of dealing with that that we went toward a more evolutive
framework.
This is rather like the evolutionary approach that caught on in game theory, in
order to get out of the self-contradictions that you inevitably roll up against in a
kth order common-knowledge framework wherek tends to infinity. I know that
sounds awfully nerdy [laughs]. But you get caught in this anytime that you depart
from full rationality; that type of contradiction will appear. We tried to escape by
imposing costs to obtaining fully rational expectations, and then working out a
dynamic version of the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox.
Woodford: You were involved early on with the economics program of the
Santa Fe Institute.
Brock: That’s right. I wasn’t there at the birth, but I was there a year later, when
we had the big conference out of which the Anderson, Arrow, and Pines volume20
came.
Woodford: Did that experience affect the development of your own ideas
much?
Brock: Yes, I think so. Because I was kind of being driven in that direction by do-
ing this empirical work. I was already working with people like Allan Kleidon, who
is very empirically oriented in finance, and Blake LeBaron and Joseph Lakonishok
who are also very empirically oriented. And forcing yourself to confront these pat-
terns in data doesn’t necessarily make you think like the Santa Fe Institute, but I
think it kind of does make you less ideological about imposing a really high degree
of rationality, likekth order common knowledge wherek is huge.
Woodford: Do you think that economists have much to gain from interdisci-
plinary efforts—from trying to work on economic problems with physicists or
biologists or computer scientists, for example?
Brock: I think I have learned a lot out of it. You have to apply a lot of judgment,
so that you don’t go running off on some nonproductive fad. There is a tendency
for those guys to write down backward-looking models, whereas the logic of
economics forces you to write down forward-looking models where the agents
have intelligence enough to understand the system they live in, at least partially.
Those guys are not used to modeling that way, and there tends to be a conflict
there. And there is also kind of a tendency to speak out on economics when
they are not all that well informed, which Paul Krugman has written very well
about.
Woodford: Which way do you think studies of economic dynamics will develop
over the next 25 or 50 years? Do you think that we are on the verge of any important
change in direction?
Brock: I think it is going to look more like a conjunction of numerical and com-
putational methods of the kind treated in Judd’s book,21 and computational statis-
tical inference like the work on the bootstrap. Because as the cost of computational
inference drops, we will rely less on analytic fiddling around in order to handle
complicated inferential problems. We’ll fiddle a lot less with analytic asymptotic
theory in econometrics, and rely much more on computational inferential tools
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like the bootstrap. But we’ll be working with more realistic models, more along
the line of Judd. I think that this is going to happen as computational technology
keeps dropping in price, at least if it keeps dropping exponentially like it has in
the past.
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